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MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
         In this appeal, the Commissioner has asked us to review 
a ruling which allowed a United States taxpayer to deduct 
interest owed to a related foreign payee when it was accrued 
rather than paid.  Specifically, we must determine whether the 
United States Tax Court erred in holding that Treas. Reg.  
1.267(a)-3 is invalid to the extent that it requires accrual 
basis taxpayers to defer deductions for interest owed to a 
related foreign payee until the year the interest is paid.  Also 
at issue is whether, assuming Treas. Reg.  1.267(a)-3 is valid, 
retroactive application of the regulation violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.   
         Because we find that Treas. Reg.  1.267(a)-3 is a 
valid exercise of the powers delegated to the Secretary under 
I.R.C.  267(a)(3), and that retroactive application of the 
regulation to the taxpayer does not violate due process, we will 
reverse the decision of the Tax Court. 
 
 
                                I. 
         The following facts were stipulated by the parties 
before the United States Tax Court.  The taxpayer is an 
affiliated group of corporations of which Tate and Lyle, Inc. 
(TLI) is the common parent, and Refined Sugars, Inc. (RSI), is a 
wholly owned subsidiary.  Both TLI and RSI are United States 
corporations and were included on the taxpayer's consolidated 
federal income tax returns for the tax years at issue.  Tate and 
Lyle plc (PLC) is a United Kingdom corporation which indirectly 
owns 100% of TLI and RSI.  The taxpayer and PLC are members of 
the same controlled group of corporations as defined in I.R.C.  
267(f). 
         PLC made interest-bearing loans to TLI and RSI, the tax 
consequence of which was interest expense to the taxpayer and 
interest income to PLC.  The taxpayer and PLC report income and 
deductions using the accrual method of accounting.  On its U.S 
income tax returns, the taxpayer deducted interest expense owed 
to PLC by TLI and RSI in the year it accrued.  The taxpayer did 
not pay the interest to PLC until the year following the year of 
accrual.   
         The interest income received by PLC was U.S. source 
income not effectively connected with a trade or business in the 
United States.  Under I.R.C.  881(a)(1), such income is subject 
to U.S. tax at a rate of 30%.  Pursuant to Article 11(1) of the 
United States-United Kingdom Income Tax Convention (treaty), 31 
U.S.T. 5668, which was in effect at all times here, the interest 
income received by PLC was exempt from United States tax. 
         The Commissioner disallowed the taxpayer's deduction 
for interest expense in the years accrued and subsequently mailed 
to the taxpayer notices of deficiency for the tax years ended 
September 29, 1985, September 28, 1986, and September 26, 1987.  
In response to the notices of deficiency, the taxpayer filed a 
petition in the United States Tax Court challenging the 
Commissioner's determination. 
         The following facts, not part of the stipulation, are 
evident from the record.  The Commissioner asserted before the 
Tax Court that I.R.C.  267(a)(2) and (a)(3) and Treas. Reg. 
 1.267(a)-3 allow payor a deduction for interest only in the tax 
year when the related payee would normally report the interest as 
income for United States tax purposes.  Normally, interest income 
received by a foreign corporation from sources within the United 
States and which is not effectively connected with a trade or 
business in this country, is reported on the cash basis method of 
accounting under I.R.C.  881 and 1442.  The Commissioner 
determined that the taxpayer was entitled to deduct interest only 
in the year it paid the interest to PLC. 
          
         The Tax Court held that because the accrued interest 
was not includable in PLC's income because of an exemption under 
the tax treaty rather than as a result of PLC's method of 
accounting, Treas. Reg.  1.267(a)-3 was invalid because it did 
not apply the matching principle of I.R.C.  267(a)(2).  A four- 
judge plurality determined that even if the provisions of Treas. 
Reg.  1.267(a)-3 were found to be within the broad regulatory 
authority granted by I.R.C.  267(a)(3), the retroactive 
application of the regulation violated the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.  Accordingly, the Tax Court found that the 
taxpayer was not required to defer its interest deduction until 
it actually paid the interest. 
         The Commissioner appeals to us from the final decision 
of the Tax Court entered on February 13, 1995.  We have 
jurisdiction under I.R.C.  7482(a).  See Lerman v. Commissioner, 
939 F.2d 44, 45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 984 (1991).   
 
                               II. 
         We turn first to the issue of whether Treas. Reg. 
 1.267(a)-3 is a valid interpretation of I.R.C.  267(a)(3).  
The validity of a treasury regulation is a question of law over 
which we exercise plenary review.  Mazzocchi Bus Co., Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 14 F.3d 923, 927 (3d Cir. 1994). 
         As amended in 1984, I.R.C.  267(a)(2) provides for a 
matching of interest deductions and income where, in the case of 
related persons, the payor is an accrual basis taxpayer and the 
payee is on a cash basis method of accounting.  Section 267(a)(2) 
specifically provides: 
           (2)  Matching of deduction and payee income 
         item in the case of expenses and interest.   
         -- If --  
                 (A) by reason of the method of 
              accounting of the person to whom the 
              payment is to be made, the amount 
              thereof is not (unless paid) includible 
              in the gross income of such person, and 
 
                (B) at the close of the taxable year 
              of the taxpayer for which (but for this 
              paragraph) the amount would be 
              deductible under this chapter, both the 
              taxpayer and the person to whom the 
              payment is to be made are persons 
              specified in any of the paragraphs of 
              subsection (b), 
 
         then any deduction allowable under this 
         chapter in respect of such amount shall be 
         allowable as of the day as of which such 
         amount is includible in the gross income of 
         the person to whom the payment is made (or, 
         if later, as of the day on which it would be 
         so allowable but for this paragraph). . . . 
 
Section 267(a)(2), as amended in 1984, applied to interest 
allowable as a deduction for taxable years beginning after 
December 31, 1983.  Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-369,  174(c), 98 Stat. 494, 708. 
         The purpose behind the 1984 amendment was to require 
related persons "to use the same accounting method with respect 
to transactions between themselves in order to prevent the 
allowance of a deduction without the corresponding inclusion in 
income."  H. Rep. No. 98-432, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1206.  The Ways and Means Committee 
further stated that "[t]he failure to use the same accounting 
method with respect to one transaction involves unwarranted tax 
benefits, especially where payments are delayed for a long period 
of time, and in fact may never be paid."  Id.  Congress thus 
amended section 267(a)(2) to require an accrual basis taxpayer to 
deduct interest owed to a related cash basis taxpayer when 
payment is made.  Id.  Congress explained that "[i]n other words, 
the deduction by the payor will be allowed no earlier than when 
the corresponding income is recognized by the payee."  Id. 
         In 1986, Congress again amended section 267, this time 
to add subsection (a)(3) because it felt that the matching 
provision of section 267(a)(2) was "unclear when the related 
payee was a foreign person that does not, for many Code purposes, 
include in gross income foreign source income that is not 
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business."  S. Rep. 
No. 99-313, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 959, reprinted in 1986-3 
C.B. (Vol. 3) 1, 959.  Section 267(a)(3) reads as follows: 
           (3) Payments to foreign persons.--The 
         Secretary shall by regulations apply the 
         matching principle of paragraph (2) in cases 
         in which the person to whom the payment is to 
         be made is not a United States person. 
 
Like section 267(a)(2), section 267(a)(3) was made retroactive to 
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1983.  Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,  1881, 100 Stat. 2085, 2914.      
           
         In accordance with section 267(a)(3), the Secretary 
issued final regulations on December 31, 1992.  T.D. 8465,     
1992-2 C.B. 12.  Treas. Reg.  1.267(a)-3(b)(1) sets forth the 
following general rule: 
         section 267(a)(3) requires a taxpayer to use 
         the cash method of accounting with respect to 
         the deduction of amounts owed to a related 
         foreign person.  An amount that is owed to a 
         related foreign person and that is otherwise 
         deductible under Chapter 1 thus may not be 
         deducted by the taxpayer until such amount is 
         paid to the related foreign person. . . . An 
         amount is treated as paid for purposes of 
         this section if the amount is considered paid 
         for purposes of section 1441 or section 1442 
         (including an amount taken into account 
         pursuant to section 884(f)). 
 
Treas. Reg.  1.267(a)-3(c) provides certain exceptions and 
special rules to paragraph (b) of this section.  Paragraph 
(c)(1), which applies to income that is effectively connected 
with the conduct of a United States trade or business of a 
related foreign person, does not apply if the related foreign 
person is exempt from United States income tax on the amount owed 
pursuant to a tax treaty.  Paragraph (c)(2) addresses the 
treatment of items exempt from tax because of a tax treaty.  
Specifically, paragraph (c)(2) requires that: 
         Interest that is not effectively connected 
         income of the related foreign person is an 
         amount covered by paragraph (b) of this 
         section, regardless of whether the related 
         foreign person is exempt from United States 
         taxation on the amount owed pursuant to a 
         treaty obligation of the United States. 
 
Thus, under the regulation, a taxpayer who owes interest to a 
related foreign person, where the related foreign payee is exempt 
from taxation on the interest received from U.S. sources not 
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business of the 
foreign payee due to a tax treaty, may not deduct the interest 
owed to the related foreign person until the taxpayer actually 
pays the interest to the related foreign person.   Treas. Reg. 
 1.267(a)-3 is effective with respect to interest deductions 
allowable in tax years beginning after December 31, 1983.  
Treas. Reg.  1.267(a)-3(d).   
         The parties to this appeal agree that Treas. Reg. 
 1.267(a)-3 is a legislative regulation which was issued 
pursuant to a clear congressional delegation of rule making 
authority.  In reviewing an agency's construction of a statute 
which it administers, we take our lead from the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, reh'g. denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).  
Under Chevron, we must first ask "whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue."  Id. at 842.  If 
Congress' intent is clear from the plain language of the statute, 
then our inquiry ends there.  Id.  If we conclude, however, that 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue 
or that the statute is silent or ambiguous regarding the issue, 
then we must determine whether the agency's interpretation "is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute."  Id. at 843. 
         Inherent in the powers of an administrative agency is 
the authority to formulate policies and to promulgate rules to 
fill any gaps left, either implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. 
Id. (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).  Where 
Congress has expressly delegated to an agency the power to 
"elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation . . 
. .  [s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling weight 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to 
the statute."  Id. at 844 (footnote omitted). 
         Applying the Chevron test, we find initially that 
Congress' intent is not clear from the plain language of I.R.C.  
267(a)(3).  Congress specifically directed the Secretary to adopt 
regulations applying the "matching principle of paragraph (2)" to 
foreign related persons.  If, as the Tax Court found and amici 
suggest, the plain meaning of section 267(a)(3) requires the 
Secretary to apply exactly the same matching principle of section 
267(a)(2) to foreign persons, then the language of section 
267(a)(3) is redundant.  The Commissioner argues, moreover, 
that if the matching principle of section 267(a)(2) was strictly 
applied here, the U.S. payor would never be entitled to an 
interest deduction because the related foreign payee would never 
have to include interest in taxable income under a tax treaty 
with the United States.  This unduly harsh result is one of the 
inequities Congress was attempting to rectify when it enacted 
I.R.C.  267(a)(2) in 1984. 
         The rules of statutory construction mandate that: 
         . . . a statute is to be read as a whole, see 
         Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 
         (1989), since the meaning of statutory 
         language, plain or not, depends on context.  
         See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept. of 
         Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 26 (1988).  "Words are 
         not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have 
         only a communal existence; and not only does 
         the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, 
         but all in their aggregate take their purport 
         from the setting in which they are used. . . 
         ."  NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 
         (CA2 1941) (L. Hand, J.) (quoted in Shell 
         Oil, supra, at 25, n.6).10 
         _______________ 
         10   See also United States v. Hartwell, 6 
         Wall. 385, 396 (1868) (in construing statute 
         court should adopt that sense of words which 
         best harmonizes with context and promotes 
         policy and objectives of legislature). . .  
 
King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991).  We do 
not believe that Congress would have enacted section 267(a)(3) if 
it intended to apply the same matching principle of section 
267(a)(2) to foreign persons.  Thus, we find that it is unclear 
from the plain meaning of section 267(a)(3) how Congress intended 
the matching principle of section 267(a)(2) to apply to foreign 
related persons. 
         We turn to our second inquiry under Chevron --  whether 
the Secretary's interpretation as promulgated in Treas. Reg. 
 1.267(a)-3 is based on a permissible construction of section 
267(a)(3).  The legislative history of section 267(a)(3) reveals 
that Congress anticipated other reasons for the mismatch of 
interest expense and income between related persons, which would 
defer the deduction of interest expense until actually paid.  In 
the Committee Reports, Congress explained the need for section 
267(a)(3), stating that section 267(a)(2), as enacted in 1984, 
was unclear when the related payee was a foreign person, which 
did not, "for many Code purposes," include foreign source income 
that is not effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business 
in gross income for U.S. tax purposes.  S. Rep. No. 99-313, 99th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 959; reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) at 959; 
H. Rep. No. 99-426, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 939, reprinted in 1986- 
3 C.B. (Vol. 2) at 939.   
         By way of example, the Committee described a situation 
where a foreign corporation, which was not engaged in a U.S. 
trade or business, performed services outside the United States 
for the benefit of a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary.  As a result 
of performing these services, the related foreign payee had 
foreign source income which was not effectively connected with a 
U.S. trade or business and, therefore, was not subject to U.S. 
tax.  In this situation, the Committee explained that the U.S. 
subsidiary could be required to use the cash method of accounting 
for the deduction of amounts owed to the foreign parent for the 
services rendered.  Id.  Although in this example the facts are 
slightly different than those presented in the case before us, it 
is clear that Congress anticipated a situation where the required 
use of the cash method of accounting by the U.S. payor is not 
based on the foreign payee's accounting method since, in the 
example, the foreign payee was not subject to U.S. tax on the 
income received from the related U.S. payor.   
         In promulgating Treasury Reg.  1.267(a)-3, the 
Secretary followed the directives of the House and Senate 
reports.  Both reports clearly indicate that Congress 
contemplated that section 267(a)(3) could be applied to 
situations where the foreign related payee was not ultimately 
subject to tax on the amount received, and that the regulations 
could require the U.S. subsidiary to use the cash method of 
accounting for the deduction of interest owed to its foreign 
parent.  We find that the rule adopted by the Secretary, 
requiring a U.S. taxpayer to use the cash method of accounting 
with respect to the deduction of interest owed to a related 
foreign person, is a permissible construction of section 
267(a)(3). 
         Having so found, we must also conclude that the 
regulation is not arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to 
section 267(a)(3).  Nothing in the legislative history convinces 
us to the contrary. 
         While the Tax Court recognized that deference must be 
given to legislative regulations, it nonetheless invalidated 
Treas. Reg.  1.267(a)-3 as being "manifestly beyond the mandate 
of [section 267(a)(3)]."  103 T.C. 656, 671 (1994).  The Tax 
Court based its holding on the fact that the Commissioner 
disallowed the taxpayer's interest deductions for reasons other 
than the method of accounting of PLC.  Both the Tax Court and 
amici argued that because the plain meaning of section 267(a)(3) 
was clear, there was no need to look to the legislative history.  
Accordingly, the Tax Court held there was no provision that 
permitted the Secretary to expand the reach of the regulations 
under section 267(a)(3) beyond the matching principle of section 
267(a)(2).  We disagree.  Recently, we reiterated the general 
rule on deference: 
             In general, unless an issue is governed 
         by an unambiguous statutory provision, courts 
         must defer to an agency's interpretation of a 
         statute it has been entrusted to administer.  
         Thus, the function for the court is not to 
         impose its own interpretation of the statute, 
         but simply to determine whether the agency's 
         interpretation "is based on a permissible 
         construction of the statute."  INS v. 
         Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445 n.29, 107 
         S. Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987).  The 
         agency's interpretation will be "given 
         controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, 
         capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
         statute."  Id. 
 
Cavert Acquisition Co. v. NLRB, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 95-3231 and 
95-3293, 1995 WL 854489, at *3 (3d Cir. May 2, 1996).  Having 
concluded earlier that the Secretary's interpretation was based 
on a permissible construction of I.R.C.  267(a)(3), we must 
reject the Tax Court's finding that Treas. Reg.  1.267(a)-3 was 
manifestly beyond the mandate of the statute.      
         In the alternative, the amici argue that Treas. Reg. 
 1.267(a)-3 is not supported by the legislative history.  Amici 
contend that the Commissioner overlooks the fact that the 
legislative history defines "matching principle" in terms of 
accounting methods.  They further contend that because the sole 
example in the Committee reports was absent from the final 
regulation, and because this example did not involve income 
exempt from tax because of a treaty, we should find that the 
Secretary's interpretation is not supported by the legislative 
history.  We believe, however, that the amici are ignoring other 
statements contained in the House and Senate Committee reports 
which clearly support the Secretary's interpretation. 
         We agree with the Commissioner that the regulation is 
not manifestly contrary to section 267(a)(3).  We believe the Tax 
Court construed the language of section 267(a)(3) too narrowly, 
especially in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Chevron.  
Accordingly, we find that the Tax Court erred in holding that 
Treas. Reg.  1.267(a)-3 is invalid to the extent it requires 
accrual basis taxpayers to defer interest deductions owed to a 
related foreign payee until the year the interest is paid. 
 
                                III. 
         Having found that Treas. Reg.  1.267(a)-3 is a valid 
interpretation of section 267(a)(3), we must now consider whether 
the retroactive application of the regulation violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The four-judge 
plurality found that the period of retroactivity in this case was 
excessive rather than modest, and therefore was unduly harsh and 
oppressive.  In reaching this conclusion, the four-judge 
plurality relied on the Supreme Court's decision in United States 
v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).  There, the Supreme Court set 
forth a two-part test for determining whether the retroactive 
application of a tax statute violates due process.  First, for 
retroactivity to be upheld, it must be shown that the statute has 
a rational legislative purpose and is not arbitrary; and second, 
that the period of retroactivity is moderate, not excessive.  Id.at 2022.  
The Supreme Court in Carlton upheld the retroactive 
application of a tax law amending a statute which had been 
enacted only a year earlier, where the amendment had been 
proposed by Congress within a few months of the statute's 
original enactment.  Id. at 2023. 
         Based on the Supreme Court's holding in Carlton, the 
Tax Court found the six year period in this case excessive, and 
thus, violative of the Due Process Clause.  We find, however, 
that Carlton is distinguishable:  Carlton involved the 
retroactive application of a statute, and here we are dealing 
with the retroactive application of a regulation. 
         The retroactivity of treasury regulations is governed 
by I.R.C.  7805(b), which states: 
         The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if 
         any, to which any ruling or regulation, 
         relating to the internal revenue laws, shall 
         be applied without retroactive effect. 
 
Clearly Congress has determined that treasury regulations are 
presumed to apply retroactively.  The extent to which newly 
promulgated regulations shall not apply retroactively is a matter 
of discretion left to the Secretary.  Automobile Club of Michigan 
v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184-85, reh'g denied, 353 U.S. 989 
(1957). 
         The amici contend that the Secretary abused his 
discretion under section 7805(b) in failing to limit the period 
of retroactivity.  In support of this position, the amici cite 
Gehl Co. v. Commissioner, 795 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1986); LeCroy 
Research Sys. Corp. v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984); 
and CWT Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 755 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986).  These cases, however, 
are distinguishable from the facts of this case.  All of the 
cases cited by the amici involved a prior express representation 
by the Commissioner in a DISC Handbook that the regulations, 
when adopted, would apply prospectively only.  In CWT Farms, the 
court of appeals stated that "[a]n abuse of discretion may be 
found where retroactive regulation alters settled prior law or 
policy upon which the taxpayer justifiably relied and if the 
change causes the taxpayer to suffer inordinate harm."  755 F.2d 
at 802.  The courts of appeals in these three cases found that 
the Commissioner abused his discretion by applying the 
regulations retroactively on the basis of their finding that the 
promise in the Handbook was binding. 
         Here, there was no such promise by the Commissioner 
regarding Treas. Reg.  1.267(a)-3.  Moreover, the taxpayer had 
adequate notice within a reasonable time that regulations would 
be forthcoming which could alter the tax treatment of its 
interest deductions.  Section 267(a)(2) was enacted on July 18, 
1984, effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 1983.  
On October 22, 1986, section 267(a)(3) was added, also with the 
same effective date.  On July 31, 1989, the Secretary announced 
rules in Notice 89-84, 1989-31 I.R.B. 8, which eventually became 
the proposed regulations, and were released on March 19, 1991.  
Then, on January 5, 1993, the Secretary released the final 
regulations applicable to section 267(a)(3), retroactive to tax 
years beginning after December 31, 1983.  Thus, as early as 
October of 1986, the taxpayer had notice that regulations would 
be forthcoming which could alter the tax treatment of its 
interest deductions for tax years 1985, 1986 and 1986. 
         Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld the retroactive 
application of tax regulations for a similar or longer period of 
retroactivity.  See, e.g., National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, 440 
U.S. at 478-82 (upholding the validity of a regulation which was 
issued six years after enactment of the statute and was 
subsequently modified ten years later).  In E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.3d 130, 139 & n. 37 (3d Cir. 
1994), we upheld the validity of a regulation adopted thirteen 
years after enactment of a statute directing the Secretary to 
promulgate regulations.     
         We find, therefore, that the retroactive application of 
Treas. Reg.  1.267(a)-3 to the tax years in question does not 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Based on 
the applicable legal standards and our earlier review of the 
relevant legislative history, we are unable to conclude that the 
Secretary abused his discretion in failing to limit the period of 
retroactivity for Treas. Reg.  1.267(a)-3.   
 
 
                               IV. 
         For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
decision of the Tax Court and remand this cause to the Tax Court 
for the entry of a decision upholding the tax deficiencies for 
the years in question. 
